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The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity:
Is There Commercial Life After Death?
Peter L. Felchert and Edward L. Rubin:
I
When the right of publicity was first articulated to protect the
ability of baseball players to profit from the use of their photographs
on bubble gum cards,' there was little indication that its descendibility
would become a major issue. In recent years, however, courts have been
besieged by litigants who claim that they should exercise control over
the publicity rights of their famous and departed forebears. 2 The
descendibility of publicity rights has proved to be a troublesome issue,
because of both the nature of the claims presented and the distinctions
to be made in separating the private and the public domains.
Two of the most recent and significant cases involve Elvis Presley,
whose ability to create controversy apparently has been unimpaired by
death. During his lifetime, Presley entered into a contract with Boxcar
Enterprises in which he conveyed the exclusive right to use his name
and likeness for commercial purposes. Since Presley's death, Boxcar's
licensee, Factors Etc., Inc., has been involved in several suits relating
to the exploitation of Presley's attributes by others. In Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,3 the Second Circuit enforced the Presley-Boxcar
contract, enjoining the unauthorized sale by Pro Arts of a poster bear-
ing Presley's photograph. Although the court declined to rule that the
t Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, New York.
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1. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
2. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. 79-1270 (6th Cir.
March 6, 1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979); Hicks v. Casablanca Records & Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
3. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
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right of publicity in general can be inherited,4 it held that the "exclu-
sive right to exploit the Presley name and likeness, because exercised
during Presley's life, survived his death."
A few months ago, in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors
Etc., Inc.,6 the Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion. 7 The case
arose when the Foundation solicited public contributions for a large
bronze statue to commemorate Presley and distributed eight-inch pew-
ter replicas of the design to anyone who donated twenty-five dollars or
more. The Foundation brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
a ruling that the Factors license would not prevent the erection of the
statue or the distribution of the pewter replicas. The district court
permitted the building of the statue but not the distribution of the
replicas.8 The Sixth Circuit found no bar to any use of the name or
likeness of Presley, and through Judge Merritt reversed.
In a carefully reasoned opinion, the court took issue with an article
by the present authors that recently had appeared in these pages,0
which argued that a person's right of publicity should be inheritable
if it has been translated into a contractual right during his lifetime.
Such a rule, according to the Sixth Circuit, would create a variety of dif-
ficulties, given the personal nature of the right, its possible conflict
with the First Amendment, and the problems in limiting both the
scope of the right and its temporal extent. In addition, the court found
that the rule would not sufficiently fulfill the social policy underlying
recognition of the right. Consequently, the court concluded that the
right of publicity, while properly recognized during a person's life-
time, should terminate at his death under all circumstances.
4. Id. at 222 n.11.
5. Id. at 222. The California Supreme Court implied a similar view in Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979), by denying the
heirs of Bela Lugosi exclusive publicity rights in his attributes upon finding that such
rights were not exploited by Lugosi during his lifetime.
6. No. 79-1270 (6th Cir. March 6, 1980).
7. Technically, the two decisions are not in direct conflict, because Pro Arts was a
diversity case governed by New York law, and Memphis Development Foundation, also a
diversity case, was governed by Tennessee law. However, both courts noted that there
were few applicable state cases, see 579 F.2d at 221; No. 79-1270, slip op. at 4, and pro-
ceeded to apply general law. In fact, the right of publicity, and related doctrines of
misappropriation and unfair competition, have been regarded as an area in which general
law prevails. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (Brandeis,
J.) (applying general law to unfair competition claim despite recent rejection of general
law in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64 (1938)). Thus the disagreement between the
two courts, even though originating in diversity cases, is tantamount to a conflict between
the circuits.
8. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
9. Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media,
88 YALE LJ. 1577, 1618-20 (1979).
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II
Most courts and commentators have approached the problem of
determining whether the right of publicity should be inheritable by
using analogies. The first analogy that seemed to suggest itself was to
the right of privacy, from which the right of publicity had evolved.' 0
Because privacy had long been held to be a personal right, terminating
with the death of the individual," this analogy led to the conclusion
that publicity rights were similarly uninheritable. 12 The Sixth Circuit
came to the same conclusion by analogizing publicity rights to def-
amation, an area of the law concerned with personal reputation and
closely related to publicity rights. 13
In recent years, an analogy to property rights also has been sug-
gested. Because the right of publicity protects the individual against
portrayals that expropriate the commercial value of his name or like-
ness, and because the individual generally makes use of the exclusive
control secured by this protection to sell the right to use his name or
likeness, publicity rights came to be regarded as a form of property.
14
This type of analogy leads to an opposite conclusion about descendi-
bility; most forms of property are devisable, and it seems reasonable
to regard a person's property rijht in his name or likeness to be
devisable as well. i
The strength of an analogical approach is that once the equivalence
is established, previously developed rationales and conclusions can be
brought to bear on the new situation; application of privacy, defama-
tion, or property analogies to the area of publicity brings previously
developed rationales and conclusions for deciding issues like descendi-
bility. But a major difficulty with analogies, derived from precisely
the same source as their strength, is that they tend to impose a mature,
elaborated system on what may well be an unformulated situation.
10. Id. at 1588-89; Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 203
(1954).
11. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 883 (1965); Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 814-15 (4th ed. 1971).
12. See, e.g., James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 653-54, 344 P.2d 799,
801 (1959); Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 144 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30-31 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
13. No. 79-1270, slip op. at 6. It is well established that the right to recover for def-
amation vanishes at death. See, e.g., Wender v. Hamburger, 393 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Thompson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 193 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1952).
14. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970).
15. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 551 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1972),
rev'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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The choice of the analogy may not be fully justifiable, and the
analogy's application to the situation may carry with it a misleading
certainty. In the present case, none of the analogies of privacy, defama-
tion, or property law seems correct to apply to the publicity issue; once
one is chosen, however, it resolves the descendibility issue with a force
much too decisive for the complex and subtle nature of the problem.
An alternative to analogy is what might be termed a policy analysis.
This involves examination, or reexamination, of the underlying social
policies on which the right is based. This type of approach avoids the
deceptive certainty and overly conclusive nature of analogy; however,
the result is often unspecific generality. Nonetheless, identification and
analysis of the applicable social policy can assist in the selection of the
appropriate analogy to apply, and the interaction of both can achieve
the proper result.
The social policy underlying the right of publicity is encouragement
of individual enterprise and creativity by allowing people to profit from
their own efforts.16 When publicity rights are involved, recognition
must be given, however, to the countervailing policy of the First
Amendment interest in the free use of information. Consequently,
publicity rights must be limited to those areas outside the scope of
First Amendment interest where other social policies prevail.
Ultimately, each of the three analogies suggested-privacy, defama-
tion, and property-fails to provide a satisfactory solution to the issue
of the descendibility of publicity rights. The type of interest protected
in a privacy action is an individual's desire to avoid unwanted public
exposure. It is understandable that such a right should vanish at death,
because it is primarily concerned with the personal sensibilities of an
individual. The same may be said about defamation, for here the
sanction is against unwanted public statements harmful to an in-
dividual's reputation. But publicity rights protect the individual's
ability to profit from public exposure, not to avoid it. Because this
right is more commercial in its nature, and generally is useful only
when it is transferred, there is no reason to assume that it cannot
be devisable as well.
On the other hand, property rights are designed to grant individuals
the power to exercise control over some entity, and to exclude others
from exercising such control, largely for the purpose of creating eco-
nomic incentives. Because passing on the property to others may have
as great a motivational effect as acquiring that property for oneself, it
16. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573, 576 (1977).
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makes sense that property is deemed to be devisable. The exclusive
control involved in most property rights, however, does not intrude
upon any constitutional principle. Yet when an individual exercises
control through a right of publicity, there often is a significant conflict
between that action and the First Amendment interest in the general
use of information. It would be inappropriate to permit this right to
be controlled by a person or his heirs in the more unrestricted manner
that applies to property in general.
III
This analysis of publicity rights calls into question the use of privacy,
defamation, and property as analogies. It also suggests, however, a more
appropriate analogy in their place. This analogy is to the copyright
law.'17 Like the right of publicity, the underlying policy of copyright is
to provide an incentive for enterprise and creativity by allowing in-
dividuals to benefit from their personal efforts.' Copyright is also
similar to the right of publicity in that the control it grants involves a
substantial possibility of conflict with the First Amendment. 9 These
similarities suggest that copyright, not privacy, defamation, or property,
is the proper analogy for defining the operation of the right of
publicity. 0
The copyright analogy provides an answer to the question of de-
17. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. 1978).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (copyright and patent power provided "[tio promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts"); see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
In Memphis Development Foundation, the court took issue with the view that the
descendibility of publicity rights could serve as motivation for enterprise. In its view,
"[t]he desire to exploit fame for the commercial advantage of one's heirs is . ..a weak
principle of motivation" in contrast to "the desire to achieve success or excellence in a
chosen field." No. 79-1270, slip op. at 4-5. The court suggested that even the desire for
financial gain during one's life is secondary to the psychic rewards of excellence. Al-
though the power of psychic reward may be conceded, this is generally beyond the reach
of conscious social policy. And any exposure to the modem-day entertainment industry
will provide ample evidence that the force of tangible incentives is far from negligible.
The fact that people enjoy a particular pursuit does not mean that they will continue to
devote their lives to it if no economic advantages are forthcoming. Even the eighteenth-
century framers of our Constitution saw fit, in the copyright clause, to reinforce the
pleasures of excellence with the rewards of economic gain.
19. See, e.g., Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970); Sobel, Copyright and the First
Amendment: A Gathering Storm? 19 COPYRIGHT L. SyvP. 43 (1971).
20. This view has been adopted by the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (interest protected under the right of publicity
"is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of
the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting
feelings or reputation"); see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (quoting Zacchini).
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scendibility of publicity rights, both with respect to the scope of the
protection that should be allowed and to the temporal extent of that
protection. Copyrights are intended to be inherited and the interests
of heirs are recognized under the copyright laws. 21 The rationale is
that the ability to leave the copyright to one's heirs, like the ability to
profit from one's creative efforts in the first place, will have a signif-
icant motivational effect. Because of the possible conflict with free
speech, however, limits have been placed on the scope of copyright
protection.2 2 A copyright extends only to the author's particular and
individual expression; material previously in the public domain in-
corporated in a copyrighted work will not be protected. The author
may not protect the ideas and general themes that form the basis of his
work. Portions of a copyrighted work may be used by others under fair
use concepts. In addition, there are certain notice and registration re-
quirements; if the author is not sufficiently motivated to comply, under
certain circumstances the work will not be protected, or full remedies
will not be available.
These same concepts can appropriately be applied to publicity rights
in general, and to the descendibility question in particular. To avoid
conflicts with the First Amendment, the right of publicity should be,
and for the most part has been, limited to essentially commercial
products, where the First Amendment interest is relatively low. 23 To
minimize any remaining conflicts with free speech, publicity rights
should be further limited to situations in which there is evidence that
they will fulfill the social policy of motivating enterprise and creative
effort. In general this means that these rights should be limited-as in
fact they are-to situations in which the individual earns at least part of
his livelihood from the publicity that is to be protected. 24 As far as the
21. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (Supp. 1978). The period of copyright protection provided in
the Copyright Act is the life of the author plus fifty years, a clear indication that copy-
rights are to be inherited. Id. § 302(a). Also, certain statutory beneficiaries are given
specific rights under certain circumstances to terminate grants of rights under copyrights
and to control the making of new grants, a clear recognition of the interests of heirs in
copyrights. Id. §§ 203, 304(c).
22. The Sixth Circuit, in analyzing the social policy underlying the right of publicity,
concluded "that making the right of publicity inheritable would not significantly inspire
the creative endeavors of individuals in our society." It found "that whatever minimal
benefit to society may result from the added motivation and extra creativity supposedly
encouraged by allowing a person to pass on his fame for the commercial use of his heirs,"
it would not outweigh the value of free access to a person's name and likeness for com-
mercial purposes after death regardless of the extent to which those attributes were
exploited by the person during his lifetime. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., No. 79-1270, slip op. at 5, 7 (6th Cir. March 6, 1980).
23. See Felcher & Rubin, sukra note 9, at 1597-99, 1606.
24. This is to satisfy the requirement of identifiable harm to a demonstrated ability to
profit from one's own attributes, which is protected to encourage individuals to pursue
socially desirable activities. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 9, at 1613-15.
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specific issue of descendibility is concerned, these rights should be
protected only when they have been translated into concrete form
through the medium of a contract. Barring such action, there is no
specific indication that the individual was motivated by any desire to
transfer the benefit of his publicity rights to others; to permit de-
scendibility under these circumstances would not fulfill the social
policy of encouraging enterprise and creativity.25
If a person is permitted to devise his right of publicity by means of
a contract, the further question arises of whether any time limit will be
placed upon the inherited right. As a practical matter, this is probably
not a source of major concern, because publicity rights generally tend
to lose their useful commercial value after a reasonable period of time;
the notion of perpetual rights, however, is admittedly troublesome. The
copyright law again provides a useful analogy, as Chief Justice Bird of
the California Supreme Court recently has suggested. 26 In its present
form, the law provides that copyright in an author's work continues
until fifty years after his death; a possibility is to apply this same rule-
or a rule with a similar express period of duration-to the right of
publicity.27
Recourse to a copyright analogy would resolve most of the concerns
voiced by the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Development Foundation.
While it is true, as the court indicated in that case, that our legal sys-
tem does not allow personal attributes to be devised,28 a contract
providing for commercial exploitation of attributes, like a copyright,
is not purely personal; it is a formalized version of an otherwise un-
realized possibility. Moreover, both types of rights avoid conflicts with
the First Amendment in the same way: by confining their protection
within an area in which the value of freely using existing speech is
outweighed by the value of encouraging the creation of new speech.
The common policy of copyright law and the right of publicity of
motivating individual effort also provides specific limits on the right
of publicity; it means that only those who earn their livelihood from
exploiting their attributes in some commercial manner, and who con-
tract for such exploitation during their lives, possess an inheritable
right. Finally, if the possibility of inherited publicity rights existing in
25. See id. at 1618-20.
26. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 846-47, 603 P.2d 425, 446-47, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 344-45 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
27. To be sure, the rule is of a statutory nature. Once having been enacted in a
statute, however, and thus ensconced in public policy, it is available for common law
decisionmaking by analogy. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). It
may be, however, that adoption of any express period of duration of a decedent's right of
publicity is more appropriately effected legislatively.
28. See No. 79-1270, slip op. at 5.
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perpetuity proves troublesome, 29 an analogy to copyright law again
suggests a solution.30
Any new right can be routed by a parade of horribles about its
implications, but a defensible analogy suggests that the legal system
can still survive after recognizing the right in question. Similarly, any
new right can be characterized as unessential, since the legal system has
managed without it; a proper policy analysis explains why recognition
of the right would be advantageous, even if not essential. A right of
publicity that is descendible in certain limited circumstances poses no
greater dangers than the similar aspects of the present copyright laws.
On the other hand, to maintain that "leaving a good name to one's
children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual" 3' is rather
harsh on those who have invested their efforts in their name, rather
than in the stock market, and constitutes a rather heavy burden to
impose on creativity. The inheritance of publicity rights serves to sup-
port a major social policy already recognized in the copyright laws.
When it can be shown to do so on a basis consistent with the social
policy of the First Amendment, it deserves recognition.
29. See id.
80. The Sixth Circuit's decision not to enjoin the sale of the statuettes may be justi-
fiable on other grounds, however. The statue of Presley, itself, being readily characterized
as art, not merchandise, is protected by the First Amendment, and is outside the scope of
publicity rights. See p. 1130 sutra. Replicas of the statue could conceivably fall within
this same protected category. Of course, it would always be possible to circumvent a
prohibition against commercial exploitation by claiming that one was selling replicas of
a single artistic work. But judging the good faith' and relevance of such a claim is the
sort of determination that courts are generally called upon to make. In the Memphis
Development Foundation case, the fact that the replicas were received from a nonprofit
organization, in return for contributions to finance construction of the original work of
art, does take the situation out of the more usual commercial setting.
31. Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. 79-1270, slip op. at 6 (6th Cir.
March 6, 1980).
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